Abstract. -This article focuses on the German involvement in the tobacco trade of Bahia, Brazil. From the 1870 s onwards, most Bahian tobacco was exported to the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg and Bremen, and German traders obtained a dominant position in the region economy. Tobacco was produced by thousands of small-holding ex-slaves, who received credit from German companies like Dannemann and Suerdieck. Even when in the beginning of the 20th century, British and US companies tried to capture part of the Bahian tobacco market, the German monopoly maintained itself. The German tobacco merchants gradually integrated into regional Bahian society. This historical process showed clear differences with what happened in the southern part of Brazil. As such, the German experience in Bahia throws an interesting light on the variety of German attitudes towards their integration in Latin American society.
INTRODUCTION
The social and economic history of Bahia in north-eastern Brazil has tended to focus on two essential export commodities: sugar and cacao. However, there was another agricultural commodity: tobacco.
This crop played a crucial role in the Bahian economy between 1870
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1 Its agricultural centre was the Recôncavo, the region west of the Bay of All Saints (Bahia de Todos os Santos), which is one of the oldest agricultural regions of Brazil. The crop provided a livelihood for many poor peasant families and employment for many workers in the processing industries. In addition, it was an important source of revenue for the state treasury. In certain periods it was the single most important source of tax income for the government. Between 1900 and 1910, tobacco was Bahia's principal export product in terms of state finances, and the crop retained its regional importance far into the twentieth century. Tobacco was already an important product in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it was closely linked to the slave trade. Rolls of sweet pressed or twisted tobacco (fumo de corda) were highly appreciated on the West African coast and played a crucial role in buying slaves for the sugar industry. After a relatively short period of stagnation, tobacco once again became an important export commodity from the 1840s onward, when German traders started to buy Bahian tobacco. This was the direct result of the end of the Portuguese monopoly in 1818 and the opening of the Brazilian ports to "friendly" nations. It was part of the general opening up of the Latin American continent to British and continental European traders during and after the wars of independence in Spanish America. In this process, the character of the sector changed. Now tobacco leaves (fumo em folha) were exported to the European cigar market. The German dominance in the Bahian tobacco export consolidated in the period after 1870. The beginning of the end of the German hegemony and the appearance of European and US competitors began in 1914 when the first World War cut off Germany from its American markets.
This article focuses on the export of Bahian tobacco. In the last decades of the nineteenth century Bahia was one of the most important exporters of tobacco to the German tobacco markets in Hamburg and Bremen and by far the most important Latin American tobacco exporter. Although part of the tobacco production was always consumed within Brazil, the international market determined the fate of the tobacco sector of the Recôncavo. This article will try to show in what ways the Bahian tobacco reached the European market and how in the period 1870-1930 the German tobacco merchants maintained a commercial monopoly in the region. Doing so, it will try to explain the emergence and partial downfall of German traders in the region.
GERMAN ASCENDANCE IN BAHIAN TOBACCO EXPORT
In his important study on the colonial tobacco sector in Bahia, Jean Baptiste Nardi shows how the Portuguese monopoly was broken in a dramatic manner in the first decades of the nineteenth century, "with unprecedented euphoria which was the result of the opening of the ports." In the five years from 1811 to 1815 the export of Bahian tobacco to "foreign nations" went from nothing to more than 300.000 arrobas, some 20 million kilos.
2 Most of this tobacco went to the German market. This process was accompanied by a change in the nature of the trade. The German market was interested in tobacco for the European cigar (and to a lesser extent: cigarette) industry and its activities therefore focused on the trade in leaves. Tobacco leaves gradually replaced the traditional tobacco roles (mangotes) in the international market.
In the course of the nineteenth century the German importers thus became decisive players on the Bahian tobacco market. Effectively, however, it was only the representatives of the two Hanseatic cities Bremen and Hamburg who were active in Brazil. These two cities were the centre of the international tobacco trade for more than a century. From the 1850s until the First World War, on average, some 90 percent of the Bahian tobacco went to Hamburg and Bremen. The dominant position of Hanseatic merchants in the Bahia tobacco sector was a good example of their remarkably effective reaction to Latin American independence. The moral and material support for the cause of Latin American independence greatly favoured the German merchants once independence had been achieved. 3 This also favoured their entrance on the Brazilian tobacco market. The position of the Hanseatic cities was quite peculiar. They were slowly but inevitably drawn into the orbit of the German Customs Union (Zollverein) that was created under the leadership of Prussia and in the 1860s and 1870s unified most German-speaking states. But during large part of the nineteenth century the Hanseatic cities were able to maintain their commercial and diplomatic independence. In close cooperation with British merchants the two Hanseatic freeports became important staple markets again in this period. They developed more as Atlantic, almost British, markets than as part of continental Germany. Hamburg and Bremen were closely linked to the British economy by way of credits, joint ventures and shipping arrangements. 4 The merchants of these cities did not share the nationalist, protectionist sentiments which were gaining ground in the rest of Germany. They wanted their commercial interests protected, but did not want to get involved in Germany's imperial ambitions. This gave them an extraordinary leverage on the Latin American markets.
Tobacco played a central role in the resurgence of the Hanseatic cities. The tobacco market was expanding rapidly in the nineteenth century. Cigars and later cigarettes became products of mass consumption and the demand for "exotic" tobacco, as the tropical kinds of tobacco were called on the European market, increased rapidly. The Hanseatic importers served as middlemen for the continental cigar factories in Germany, the Netherlands, France and Spain, but also in Eastern Europe and Sweden. In the last decades of the nineteenth century Bahia was, after Kentucky, the second most important exporter of tobacco to the German tobacco markets in Hamburg and Bremen and by far the most important Latin American tobacco exporter. Bahian tobacco became a central ingredient in the cheap cigars which were produced in German factories. It was common-sense that "Brazil tobacco [was] the daily bread of the German cigar manufacture".
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The German position remained, also after 1918, quite strong, but gradually the German traders had to accept that new competitors were nibbling at their monopoly. This had to do with a restructuring of the international tobacco market. First, the consumption of cigars was losing its place to that of cigarettes, leading to the restructuring of the international tobacco market. Secondly, competition increased. Within Brazil, the production of lighter kinds of tobacco in the southern regions of the countries, especially Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, increased dramatically. This also stimulated a national manufacturing tobacco industry. An increasing amount of the Bahian tobacco went to the national tobacco industry. The growing demand of the Argentinean tobacco manufacturing industry also resulted in an increasing amount of the Bahian tobacco going to that country. In 1918 already 25 percent of the Bahian tobacco was diverted to Argentina. 6 These developments favoured local Brazilian companies, which were given the chance to confront the German dominance. This created a more competitive market in which German entrepreneurs continued to play an important role, but lost their unchallenged dominant position. Brazilian mercantile companies were able to take advantage of new opportunities on the regional tobacco market to improve their business position. The beginning of World War II sealed the fate of the German trade and put an end to the German predominance.
THE EUROPEAN TOBACCO MARKET
The international market for cigar tobacco was (and is) very complex. Every kind of tobacco had its own value. The segmented nature of the tobacco trade led to a specific market organisation which possessed different levels. The European market used brokers, so-called Makelaars, who tuned supply and demand. A description from Bremen provides a good insight:
"The organisation of the tobacco trade in Bremen is built around the importers, the 'second-hand' firms and the brokers who are the intermediaries between them. The importer who maintains direct contact with the tobacco-producing firms oversee, presents newly arrived tobacco to the Bourse after having given potential buyers the opportunity to inspect it. The broker who works for the second-hand business, negotiates with him on basis of the instructions he has received from his employer. Then the tobacco is sold to the highest bidder, or, when the price is too low, it is withdrawn from the market". 7 The international tobacco market could also in another way be considered as a segmented market. Different kinds of tobacco were used and sold for different purposes. In every quality class, tobaccos competed with each other. Cigar manufacturers could play with this situation. The tobacco trade was determined by the ways in which the different parties were able to use the segmentation of the tobacco market and the lack of commercial transparency. Its specific facilities and expertise were the basis of the strong position of the German market until the first World War. It was difficult to circumvent the intermediation of the German importers. This became very clear in the negotiations between the German exporters and the French tobacco monopoly in 1910. The Dutch tobacco journal De Tabaksplant reported:
"Selling of Bahian tobacco to the French régie never takes place without the intermediation of the German traders, because the régie is not accustomed to use the lower classes of every load of tobacco. Because our traders, as is well-known, sell only unclassified loads, they need the [German] intermediaries who can sell these lower qualities for such prices that the price they have to pay for a whole load is profitable". 8 When Brazilian companies tried to establish direct trading relations with the French régie, they failed, "due to the fact that it finds certain commercial facilities in the German market". 9 The complexity of the tobacco market gave the German importers a decisive advantage. Cigars acquired their specific taste by a combination of different kinds of tobacco. After the 1860s, the Netherlands Indies (now: Indonesia) became the most important producer of cigar tobacco, but cigar factories continued to need other kinds to combine with the tobacco from Sumatra or Java. This is where the Latin American tobacco from Colombia, the Dominican Republic or Brazil came in. These regions produced a cheap, strong tasting, dark tobacco which was well suited to the European cigars. As we will see, because of its specific taste, Bahian tobacco was considered indispensable by European cigar-making factories. This greatly enhanced its market position. De Tabaksplant, reported in 1904 that it would be impossible to push out Bahian tobacco from the European market, 
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Java tobacco was the only kind that came close to Bahian tobacco. The price fluctuations of these two types of tobacco were closely linked to each other. When the harvest in Java had been disappointing, prices of Bahian tobacco went up; and vice versa. In the first decades of the twentieth century the competition between these two regions continued to be important. Companies which traded in Bahian tobacco often determined the possibilities of Bahian tobacco by looking to the Java market. In 1923, the representative of Dannemann, Jonas, reported for instance from Germany: "The market conditions for tobacco is more favourable than ever, because Brazilian tobacco is presently cheaper than Java". 11 The fact that the first was principally traded in Germany and the latter in the Netherlands gave an added political flavour to this competition which would gain importance during the First World War.
NEGOTIATING TOBACCO IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
The fate of the yearly Bahian tobacco crop was thus decided by a whole set of factors. Huge profits could be made, but losses were just as often unavoidable. What mattered first was the size of the harvest.
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Of course, the size of tobacco harvest was very difficult to assess as long as not all the tobacco was brought to the warehouses and packed. A small harvest was easier sold, and for higher prices, than a large one. Even the cultivators or the agents in the region itself were unable to predict the coming harvest with any degree of certainty. The expected quality of the tobacco caused vehement debates and every new season, all kinds of rumours were spread.
The great influence of the harvest predictions could be seen in 1891-92. Good predictions all but paralysed mercantile activities in September 1891. All traders were waiting for the price to drop. In October, the first rumours went around that the harvest was disappointing after all. When these rumours were confirmed by official reports, a "real buying fever" suddenly took place. In a short period of fourteen days unprecedented sales took place, reaching a number of 120.000 packs. In 1901, the reverse happened. When in October a large harvest was reported, in a few weeks time the prices went down. These price variations presented opportunities for gain, but could also cause losses.
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The stocks of the German importers also played an important role. Had the German companies been able to sell all their tobacco, they would be inclined to buy the new harvest. When there was a lot of tobacco left from the former harvest, they were hesitant to buy new tobacco. It was not difficult to know the situation of stocks for all parties involved in the trade, because the tobacco press gave detailed reports on import and sales of tobacco. Large stocks therefore not only influenced the commercial activities of the importers. It also determined the attitude of the Bahian exporters. When cultivators and exporters in Bahia knew that no stocks were left in Germany, they were tempted to ask higher prices for their tobacco. We could thus speak of a kind of delayed market effect.
The large national tobacco monopolies (régies) were very important in this respect. They determined to a great extent the commercial fortunes of the German importers. They were large purchasers and were therefore in a good position to negotiate with the German importers. They bought much tobacco when it was cheap, and tried to build stocks for periods in which the harvest was small and prices increased. In this way they tried to push down the prices. The German tobacco journal, the Deutsche Tabakzeitung reported in 1904 that the European régies had manipulated the market:
"Because the foreign regies noticed that there was no competition from German traders and manufacturers in Hamburg and Bremen, they did all they could to push prices down and in this way could amply provide for their needs; the markets were permanently controlled by these regies and it is not exaggerated to say that in recent years the prices for Brazil tobacco on our German markets have been determined by foreigners". 14 A last complicating factor in international trade were the exchange rates. In the period under study, sharply varying values of the national currencies occurred, both in Germany and Brazil. The tobacco trade, because of its pre-financed character, was highly susceptible to changing exchange rates. When, for example, the Brazilian exchange rate increased with 15 to 20 percent in April 1886, the tobacco trade came to a standstill, because, as was reported, "the diminished exchange rates in Brazil have increased the costs of tobacco importation". 15 In the following years the changing exchange rate led to price increases of 15 to 20 percent for German importers. During the so-called Encilhamento, a period of inflation and financial instability in the early 1890s following the overthrow of the monarchy, the same thing happened. The same process can be noted when in Germany, during the Weimar Republik, inflation went rampant. To counter the insecure situation, commercial transactions in Hamburg and Bremen were done in pounds or dollars. Nevertheless, the financial chaos and the general feeling of insecurity depressed the tobacco trade. It was reported from Germany in 1923: "The commercial situation is therefore very depressed and nobody can tell when business will pick up again".
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THE TOBACCO TRADE IN BAHÍA
Bahian tobacco was a crop mainly cultivated by small-scale peasants. Its commercialisation and export was a complex and often unpredictable affair. Tobacco cultivation was done without much technological sophistication and largely depended on the weather and the fertility of the soil. The size of the Bahian tobacco harvest therefore greatly varied from one year to the other. The tobacco was harvested by the peasant family. Before it could be packed and exported the leaves had to be dried and cured. This was generally done at the peasant farm.
These three activities determined the eventual quality of the crop. The yearly uncertainty about the quantity and the quality of the Bahian tobacco crop gave the tobacco trade a specific character which we will outline in the following.
The German importers financed the buying of tobacco in Bahia and to that end lent money to the German and Bahian exporters in the region. As it was stated: "The Bahian export banker is the foreign importer to whom they consign their tobacco". 17 The former lent the money to intermediaries, who paid the cultivators. This whole cycle was extremely complicated, even more so, because these credits in part consisted of promises and guarantees. The German importers promised money to the exporters, who promised it to the intermediaries, who in expectation of this money they would receive for the tobacco gave credit (often in the form of consumption goods) to the cultivators. Representatives and agents of the mercantile companies travelled across the region and bought the tobacco from the farmers. Normally the agreements about price and conditions were made long before the tobacco was ready to be exported. It is not clear if the cultivators always received credit, but there is no doubt that the peasant economy was based on the expected income from the tobacco. Because tobacco often stayed in the warehouses of the traders or factories for a long time before it was processed and sold, it had become customary to give extreme long instalments for tobacco purchases, from 6 to 12 months.
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In principle, the market of tobacco was based on free and open competition. Reality was quite different. German importers gave advances to Bahian tobacco companies which took charge of buying the tobacco. In these cases, the Bahian intermediaries may be considered employees of the German companies. The latter set limits to prices, decided which, when and how much tobacco to buy. In other situations, the importers ordered certain shipments of tobacco. They usually paid part of the costs in advance. Normally, these advances were accompanied by contracts about the price charged for the different types of tobacco, but in these cases the German importer had only restricted space for manoeuvring. Much tobacco was sold in advance (op voorhand) or by private contract. Samples were shown to interested buyers who could buy the tobacco before it reached the open market. In an inelastic market this meant higher prices. In 1901 it was reported: "In times, like the present, when every merchant wants to buy, the merchant who is offered a private arrangement, will not dare to refuse the offer of preference, because he is afraid that his neighbour will accept and that he will remain without the much needed commodity". 19 As long as German importers needed
Bahian tobacco as a necessary ingredient for their cigars, this system remained in vigour. It was observed in 1909: "The so-called 'advance' system supports the attempts of the Bahia firms to increase the prices as high as they wish, because the merchants, who often during many consecutive years sold the same brands of tobacco, can hardly decide to give up these brands". This same observer noted that this practice hampered agricultural innovation and the possibilities to introduce new types of tobacco on the international market.
20
Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, the merchants did not worry very much about the preparation of the tobacco. The quality of the tobacco leaves depended on thousands of small-scale cultivators who dried and cured the tobacco in (and often outside) their poor sheds. When the tobacco was dried and cured the peasants brought it to the warehouses which were built in the tobacco regions of the Recôncavo, especially Sâo Felix and Cruz das Almas. Thus, the merchants repacked, selected and labelled the tobacco. Because of this system in which they only packed the tobacco, these intermediaries and exporters were normally called enfardadores, packers. As the German tobacco expert Mehrman noted: "The peasant brings the tobacco loose or in deficient bales to the towns where it is selected and packed for transport in the warehouses. The bales are given a sign on the outside, which states the place and quality". 21 After having done this, the enfardadores sent the tobacco by boat over the Bay of All Saints to the central warehouses in Salvador from where the tobacco was sent to Europe by German steamships which regularly called on the port.
The commercial system in Bahia posed some problems. The Bahian merchants did all they could to fetch the highest possible price, often with not entirely honest means. This explains the regular complaints in the European tobacco press about the deficient and uneven quality of the Bahian tobacco. This was normally blamed on the peasants and the fact that the Bahian merchants were not prepared to take charge of the preparation of the tobacco once it was harvested. The Bahian exporters were also accused of dishonest practices. They were blamed for putting inferior leaves in high quality bales or by giving false labels to tobacco from inferior regions. The most important German tobacco journal complained in 1893: "It is regrettable that, as a result of arbitrary packing and selecting and incorrect statements of place of origin, the trade since a number of years has started to moved on unstable ground". 22 In the next year it even wrote about "the every years returning Brazil fraud". 23 In 1901 it was observed:
"The experience of the past years and the frequent damage have taught all people active in the Brazil trade, that the so-called enormous harvests are nothing else but fallacies, which leads those lost in the marsh to destruction. Not only those involved in the Brazilian trade has experienced this, but those involved in the importation of Brazilian tobacco even more so".
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Another problem affecting the Bahian tobacco trade was the indication of different tobacco types. The marking of tobacco was an important part of the tobacco trade. Better-quality tobacco from Säo Felix or Cruz das Almas fetched much higher prices than inferior types coming from the Sertäo regions. It also differentiated tobacco from one exporter to the next. Bahian intermediaries and exporters often mixed different kinds of tobacco in the bales they sent away, sometimes to deceive the purchasers, sometimes to acquire a specific position in the tobacco market. It was observed in 1901 that "the packer in Bahia uses the tobacco which he has bought in the different districts, for the preparation of his own 'trade mark', the choice of which is determined by many considerations, in which the quality of the tobacco hardly ever plays a role". 25 This problem seems to have been part of the modernisation of the tobacco export since the 1870. This is suggested by reports which mention that the Bahian brand names were more trustworthy in former times. 26 The complaints of the European importers were so vehement, because the fate of cigar makers were dependent on a uniform, predictable product. The practice of mixing tobacco continued to be a characteristic of the tobacco trade, because it was an essential part of the profit mechanism in the tobacco commerce. It also demonstrated the contrasting interests of the Bahian and European parties. In a letter to his German partners, Adolf Jonas accused local traders of fraud but in the same breath, ridiculed European importers who ventilated unwarranted complaints:
"It is undeniable that we can offer some kinds of tobacco more cheaply than others. That is not to say that sometimes the cheaper tobacco travel under an expensive flag. These days, for instance, we are asked for the 'real' brand Matta do Inhata. -However, we happen to know the Inhata very well: it is packed in Bom Jardim and the owner has never tried to sell it as 'real' Matta, that is Matta de S Felix or Cruz das Almas, but simply baptised his tobacco 'Matta do Inhata', because that is how the neighbourhood is normally called in popular language, probably because in former times it was still jungle. The same thing happens with the other brands [...] We who are in the middle of this and look at the extravagances of the packers, whose bosses are far away in Salvador where they just look at the tobacco which is ready to be shipped, have often difficulty to hide our bewilderment". 27 In the course of time the German exporters tried to take some measures to improve the quality of the Bahian tobacco. Ferdinand Ottens may be considered the first merchant who realised that the solution of the problem would have to begin with the cultivation methods of the peasant producers. Only by improving and standardising the agrarian methods the merchants could hope for a more uniform product. In the last decade of the nineteenth century he started to send employees to the countryside who tried to teach the cultivators better agricultural methods. They also tried to obtain clear standards for selecting and packing the tobacco. When other firms followed his example, the mercantile community acquired more control over the cultivation process of tobacco. German exporters in Salvador started to hire local packers who packed the tobacco for them according to standard procedures.
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Overbeck considered this an essential transformation of the tobacco trade which gave the German traders a decisive advantage: "Hereby the nature of the whole commercial practice changed, which also in the interior came in this way rapidly under German control".
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This transformation signalled a more general tendency in which the exporters tried to impose higher standards on the Bahian tobacco. In 1902 the German exporters in Bahia jointly installed a tobacco inspection directed by Gustav Laporte, brother of the German consul.
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Individual companies also took measures to improve the quality of the tobacco and to safeguard a steady supply. They tried to obtain control over a segment of the tobacco cultivators and established their own experimental fields. These efforts continued after the first World War when German companies tried to regain their lost ground. Eduard Dannemann wrote, for instance, in 1925: "We ourselves have already spent a lot of money and maintain experimental fields with the purpose of demonstrating the peasants how they have to cultivate and to obtain high quality seeds, something that is still very unusual here". 31 It is not clear what were the results of these efforts, but we may be sure that it reflected the importance of the German tobacco interest in the region and their desire to obtain a better quality and more uniform product.
THE GERMAN TOBACCO COMMUNITY IN BAHIA
The German community in Bahia deserves a study of its own. Its existence could throw light on many aspects which are central to the debates on German migration to Latin America, its influence on regional development and, in a broader sense, on changing social and ethnic relations in Brazil in the period of export-led development. The German migrants in Bahia constituted themselves as an entrepreneurial class, but also as an (ethnic) community. A number of Germans settled in the region, created families, remained in the region and gradually became Bahian. Others only stayed in the region as long as their commercial fortunes allowed them to and suddenly disappeared from the records. It would be interesting to know to what extent they maintained contact with German culture and felt themselves part of the German process of nation building which was taking place in that period. Here we will focus on the place of the German community in the Bahian tobacco sector.
There was a clear pattern in the life cycle of the tobacco enterprises. Young men started as employees for existing companies and eventually started for themselves or became partners. Other German entrepreneurs associated themselves with German companies, but never really settled in the region and finally returned to Germany. The instability and speculative nature of Bahian commerce caused frequent changes and many firms disappeared quickly, merged with others, or were incorporated in existing ones. Family names such as Heineken, Meyer, Stender, Laporte or Hoffmann, all represented considerable financial and commercial interests in the region at the end of the century, but had disappeared in the twentieth century. Other families, such as Hasselmann or Foppel became so Brazilian that they lost contact with the German community.
The available sources indicate that the Germans were a closely knit, but fluid community. They worked for each other, established companies and co-operated in business deals. At the same time, they maintained strong links with the Hamburg and Bremen importers. In his early description of the Bremen tobacco trade, Mehrman wrote: "These [German] tobacco exporters are either branches of importers from Bremen or independent exporters who have established structural business links with Bremen houses". 32 In general, the German importers provided the German exporters in Bahia with the money to buy tobacco. Since 1874 Bahia was connected to the global telegraph system and during the harvest season in which prices were set, there was frequently contact between business associates in Bahia and Germany. 33 There was also a close connection between the mercantile community and the official diplomatic representation of Germany in Bahia. Various merchants held consular posts. The German tobacco community also organised its own organisations, among which the most important was the Deutsche Verein Bahia, which had both social and commercial functions. It is not clear to what extent it was also part of the German imperialist ambition as it happened in other regions of Latin America. Two German family names stand out when we analyse the history of Bahian tobacco from a present-day perspective: Dannemann and Suerdieck. These names represent tobacco companies which to a great extent determined the destiny of the Bahian tobacco sector until our days (although the original Dannemann firm went bankrupt in 1954). Other names, like that of Ferdinand Ottens or William Overbeck, disappeared, but were also very important in the development of the Bahian tobacco sector. Ottens held at a certain moment such a dominant position that he earned himself the title "rei do fumo", "tobacco king", at the end of the nineteenth century. After a long trail of commercial ventures he died in Germany. His example demonstrates that commercial success did not always lead to long-term settlement.
Geraldo Dannemann could be considered the most important figure in the Bahian tobacco history. He came to the region in 1873 where he was employed by the German exporter L. G. Meyer. 35 Rapidly he bought a cigar factory owned by another German. He was then 22 years old. He moved the factory to Säo Felix and named it the Fábrica de Charutos Dannemann. This factory combined the exporting of tobacco and the manufacturing of cigars. It gradually extended its activities to other regions of Brazil, where representatives were appointed. This combination of activities would become a more general trend in many Latin American tobacco regions in the twentieth century, but in this period it was unique for Bahia. The Dannemann firm was exemplary for the strong position of Bahian tobacco on the world market. Where in the European tobacco journals the tobacco exporters in the Dominican Republic or Colombia were described with a kind of disdain and paternalism, the Brazilian exporters were feared. Their strong market position earned them the respect of European importers, but also a clear competitive envy. European observers complained about the intransigent attitude of the Bahian exporters (houders) whose exigencies (hooge eischen) spoiled the development of the tobacco trade. It is interesting to note that these complaints started in the mid 1870s. It was reported in 1875 that "the [Bahian] exporters demand higher prices every day". 36 It could well be that this new attitude was partly the We know less about the Overbeck company, also because it no longer exists today. Hermann Overbeck was one of the early German merchants who settled in the region. When he and his partner Hoyer died, the company was taken over by William Overbeck in 1904. After he had associated himself with Hans Steinbach in 1910, the enterprise was turned into a limited liability company in 1922. William Overbeck became a central figure in the German community in Bahia and in 1923 wrote a book, which until today has remained an invaluable source for Bahian social and economic history. The Overbeck company was in 1935 the second largest exporter of Bahian tobacco.
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These three companies may be considered exceptional with respect to their success and duration. Nevertheless, their development reflected the strength of the Bahian tobacco sector. They combined the export and manufacture of tobacco, and were in close contact with the German importing market. In one of the few studies on Bahian tobacco, Costa Borba writes:
"The fact that they combine two activities has brought them great profits, because they easily and directly acquire the prime material, without being dependent on providers who pressure them. In addition, they know the consumer market and commercial networks, because they maintain close links with firms in Bremen and Hamburg It is clear, however, that these links were liable to erosion with the passing of time. The Bahian Germans were involved in a process of social and economic integration in the region. In this process they developed new networks and other interests, which gradually distanced them from their German colleagues. This was not only an economic, but also a political process.
The German trading communities in Bahia show some interesting differences with the German trading firms in other parts of Brazil, especially in the South. 40 In the first place, German immigrants in regions like Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina were not dependent on one particular product. The majority of these immigrants were peasants seeking to settle as smallholders on virgin lands to take on family farming. Although many of the German traders that settled in the South were connected to firms in Germany, the main basis for their economic success was the thriving agrarian settlement society forged by the German immigrants. In fact, the expanding frontier economy generated tradable surpluses for sale at the regional or national (Rio de Janeiro or Sâo Paulo) markets rather than for export 38 to Germany. German merchants acted more as dealers for Germanmade manufactured goods than as exporters of agricultural products. In addition, the scale and significance of German-originated business ventures in Southern Brazil greatly surpassed those in Bahia. German entrepreneurs in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina founded important commercial and industrial dynasties in food processing, textiles, leather and footwear, metal working and machine building.
Secondly, the immersion of German entrepreneurs in a broader process of immigration and settlement made them part of a larger 'ethnic community' within Brazil. Initially, this allowed them to flourish within the special economic and social and cultural niches provided by Brazilian society. They kept their distance from the dominant 'LusoBrazilian' landholding elites and oligarchic politicians, but especially after the establishment of the Republic, German notables rose to prominence at the local and regional political levels. The blending of the German immigrant communities into Brazilian national society was accelerated after the first World War and especially because of the anti-German cultural policies of the Vargas regime during the second World War. In this way the German entrepreneurs were "brazilianised" and eventually became full members of the regional elite. In Bahia, only Geraldo Dannemann followed such a pattern. Other German businessmen rose to prominence within tobacco society and the municipalities of the western Recôncavo maintaining links with Germany and keeping social and cultural distance to the regional elite.
Ironically, this attitude appears to have helped German tobacco merchants in their contacts with the masses of black and mulatto tobacco producers. They were not affected by the strong racism which thwarted commercial relations between Bahian elites and the ex-slave population. In this way they were able to establish pragmatic commercial relations with the new emerged sector of black tobacco peasants. On the other hand, they could stay clear of the extreme nationalism that was gaining ground in Germany. To this international context of the position of the German traders we will turn now.
THE PRACTICE OF EXPORTING TOBACCO: THE DANNEMANN COMPANY
It is very difficult to analyse the logic and mechanisms of this trade in a historical perspective. Historical sources seldom contain information on the daily practice of the mercantile community and its dealings on the different levels of its business. This is even more so, because the merchants did everything to confuse their competitors. They spread false rumours, gave wrong or partly wrong information in the tobacco press. In their own dealings they often used intricate codes and secretive languages so as to confuse curious outsiders. In addition, hardly any business archives have remained which would allow historians to reconstruct the detailed logic of tobacco trade. In the light of these difficulties, the archive of Dannemann & Cia. which is kept in the municipal archive of Sao Félix, is very interesting. It covers the period March 1923 -December 1924, the period of the dramatic inflation in Germany, and contains the correspondence between the different employees of the firm who were involved in the tobacco commerce. We will use this correspondence to obtain a better understanding of the daily practice of the tobacco trade.
The Dannemann company became a joint stock company in 1922. The company had a specific nature because it both manufactured cigars and exported tobacco. It had representatives in different cities in and outside Brazil. 41 Its principal activity was the production of cigars, but the export of tobacco on which we focus here, was always an important activity of the firm. This situation could work to the advantage of the company. In a letter to an associate in Paraiba, Dannemann complained in 1922 about the lack of activity on the tobacco market and the low prices. He finished his lamentation as follows: "We are already used to these problems and we have to see how we get over them. And we have to keep in mind: the cigar business only thrives because of this situation".
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The Dannemann correspondence shows, above all, the erratic and complex character of the tobacco trade. It is full of information about letters received and sent, new developments and possible consequences for the future of the company. It also shows the agreements by which the Dannemann company allied itself with other firms. These alliances were meant to obtain a greater commercial range in markets where Dannemann was not represented. In Brazil for instance, it had consolidated contacts with the Säo Paulo cigar company of Joâo Gomes. In the European market, Danneman was involved in a so-called Konsortium. In this Konsortium different firms came together, both from production zones and European marketplaces. These alliances were intended to improve scale and efficiency of the involved firms. However, because they were concluded between competitors, they tended to be quite unstable and fraught with tensions and distrust. There was a constant reshuffling of these alliances, due to new opportunities or disagreement on commercial decisions.
In 1923 Biedermann answered in a telegram: "Whether the Americans are also involved is difficult to say, is however probable, because we cannot assume that the German firms the large purchases that have meanwhile been done, can finance themselves, although they are very wealthy". 44 In the light of this situation, it is surprising that, late in December of the same year, Dannemann received a letter by the Bremen company, W. B. Michaelsen, which according to Biedermann was involved in this new konsortium. In this letter Michaelsen offered his services to Dannemann. He suggested that at this moment Bremen was a much better and dynamic tobacco market than Hamburg. Therefore it would be in Dannemann's interest to ship his tobacco directly to Bremen in which case the Michaelsen company, which "as importer of Brazil tobacco plays a leading role", was prepared to act as intermediary. Michaelsen wrote: "We are, of course, prepared to give you a nice advance payment for the tobacco which you give us in consignation [...]". 45 In the rest of his letter he suggested that the market for Bahia tobacco was very good, because of the expectation of a small harvest. This may also have been the reason for his letter. Unfortunately, we do not dispose of the answer of Dannemann, but we know his opinion about Luis Baretto from a letter to Biedermann:
"It is exactly this firm which has completely demoralised the market. Because the gentlemen from Amsterdam are so exaggeratedly reticent, I assume that the buying by Baretto must be explained by the concern in Bremen. The whole purchasing activity by Baretto has an 'American' ring to it". 46 These bits of evidence are above all interesting because they show the anxiety of the international tobacco market and the ways competitors were watching each other. It also demonstrates the complexities of commercial dealings in the Bahian tobacco. This aspect of the tobacco trade was visible both in Brazil and Europe. Buyers tried to postpone their purchases when they considered the prices to be too high, but they were always afraid to be too passive. If they were too late, they could not fulfil their obligations and risked financial losses. Selling parties were in the opposite position. They tried to hold on to their tobacco when prices were low, but at the same time feared to remain with their tobacco. This could bring them problems of liquidity and caused extra storage and insurance costs. In light of this speculative nature of the tobacco market it is no wonder that all parties were closely watching each other.
Here the particular significance of the long-term presence of German tobacco traders and cigar manufacturers in Bahia becomes manifest. Initially supported by the ties of Bahian tobacco with two Hanseatic cities, the German merchants who settled in Bahia evolved into key players within the local tobacco sector. When the decline of tobacco exports to Hamburg and Bremen became evident and the German prominence in the Brazil trade was jeopardised, a number of these merchants were able to adapt to changing conditions and to shift their business strategies accordingly. As a result, they lost their German distinctiveness and gradually integrated into local networks.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND TOBACCO TRADE
The predominance of German interests in the region also had a political side. Germany became an important political and economic world power in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It was the major European competitor of the British empire, but also presented a threat to US interests in Latin America. 47 This situation also affected the development of the Bahian tobacco trade. Commerce and politics often intertwined. Already early in the twentieth century, fear existed among the German tobacco interests for what they called the "Anglo-Saxon peril". When in 1901 prices of Bahian tobacco suddenly went up, rumours had it that this was the result of US speculations meant to capture the Brazilian tobacco market, just as they had done with the coffee. 48 In 1912 there were incessant rumours that British and American "capitalists" had established a "Trust dos fumos", "uma empreza colossal". Although its activities were predominantly geared towards the south, it was feared that the Trust was trying to increase its hold over the Brazilian tobacco sector. It was written: "The retail commerce of tobacco is terrified. It is said that the British, after having become the lords of the trade, will bury their fingernails in the consumers". 49 Later there were political protests against the Trust, which acted "with enormous quantities of British capital and, unfortunately, helped by less scrupulous Brazilians". 50 Eventually, representatives of the British-American company visited the region and conducted conversations with German companies.
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They wanted to buy themselves into German enterprises. German consular representatives warned for this new competitor. They saw them as a risk for German commercial dominance. The German commercial community seemed divided. The old director of the Poock company was considered a fervent opponent of the Trust. He fulminated against the idea that "any German cigar factory would go over into British hands". 52 Other firms took a more pragmatic stand. in Germany, clearly restricted the freedom of action of German businessmen.
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The Dannemann company seemed to have come close to some kind of a contract. This fact was enough to provoke criticism among the German community, within and outside the region. German consular officials suggested that these negotiations "were an insult not only to German commerce, but also to German nationalism (germanismo)".
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The mercantile community in Bremen was also opposed to these dealings. Its tobacco press published critical articles on the Dannemann company, in which the latter was, among other things, accused of paying very low salaries to its Brazilian cigar makers (operarios). The director of the company, Adolf Jonas, felt obliged to vehemently deny these rumours. He asserted that the company "continued to be German just as it had been before" and that "the owners of the firm are also known and considered for their completely German spirit".
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Politics influenced the German tobacco interests even more during the First World War. When Brazil joined the Allied forces, German diplomatic representatives were forced to leave the country and entrepreneurs had to keep a low profile. Bahia was cut off from the German market in Hamburg and Bremen and the trade underwent a complete transformation. The cities of Hamburg and Bremen lost their former monopoly and their profitable commerce went into different hands. The Dutch tobacco cities Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which until then had concentrated almost exclusively on Dutch East Indian tobacco, used the War to establish a firm hold on the trade in the major Latin American tobacco regions, such as Bahia. A Dutch observer wrote: "England succeeded in taking over a small part of the commerce. Nevertheless, the Dutch in a masterful way were able to divert the major part of the German commerce to their markets". 56 In the period between the two World Wars, German influence on the Bahian tobacco trade returned, but German tobacco traders were never able to regain their former power. They had to accept that the market had become much more competitive now. end has come to the dominant position [of Germany] and its capacity of decisively influencing the market". 57 Hamburg and Bremen continued to be important markets for Bahian tobacco, but much Brazilian tobacco was sold in Holland now. The correspondence of a company like Dannemann shows the ambivalence of the German-Bahian exporters. They had long-standing and emotional links with the Germans, but their sense of business directed them to the Dutch market. Dannemann only started to export tobacco to Bremen again in 1923, five years after the end of the war. And even then it looked more an emotional decision than good business. The company's representative in Bahia, A.Jonas, wrote his superiors a little worried: "[This decision] is costing us much energy and from our side also sacrifices". It was, above all, motivated by the fact that "our old connections have become dear to us through the years and we do not want them to slip away easily". He expressed the hope that the importers in Bremen and Hamburg would join forces in order to regain their dominant position in the Bahian tobacco trade. His rhetorical question was clear enough: "Should the German markets not do all their best to maintain their dominant position in the Brazil commerce?" 58 This question already expressed his doubts. Despite its emotional attachments, the company quickly established warehouses for imported tobacco in Amsterdam. It decided in 1925 not to send tobacco to Hamburg or Bremen any more, "because of the recent very bad experiences". 59 This leads to the conclusion that Dannemann followed his own business interests and took a respectful distance to the partisan German nationalism of the period. This may have been an important explanation for the firm's long-term success in Bahian business.
CONCLUSION
The German presence in the Bahian tobacco trade needs further research. There can be no doubt that is has played a crucial role in the organisation of the regional economy and the development of the export-oriented tobacco agriculture in the region. This article suggests a number of factors which can explain how German influence in the 57 Overbeck, Fünfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein (note 29), p. 172. 58 Bahian tobacco trade could become so overwhelming and how it could maintain itself in spite of many political and economic setbacks.
First, Bremen and Hamburg were the dominant tobacco markets in the late nineteenth century world market. They could offer a number of commercial and financial advantages which for competitors were difficult to equal. The German entrepreneurs who settled in the region took advantage of the commercial and kinship networks in these two cities.
Secondly, the fact that Germans settled permanently in the region gave them an important comparative advantage over their competitors. Not only did they have good contacts with the German import market, but also with Bahian society and Brazilian politics. This enabled them to weather a number of political storms and also allowed them to defend their commercial interests quite effectively.
Thirdly, this situation tended to reproduce itself because of the specific characteristics of he tobacco trade. The tobacco trade'strongly depended on well-established contacts and a reasonable mutual trust. Tobacco was no bulk product and its commercialisation required a very specific expertise and commercial knowledge. These characteristics were not easy to acquire by newcomers on the market.
Finally, the German tobacco merchants extended their activities into the manufacturing of tobacco relatively early. They followed the very successful example of the Dannemann company and often started to make their own cigars. This attitude increased their independence towards the world market and tended to enhance their integration in Brazilian society.
Nevertheless, these characteristics did not preclude important changes in the organisation of the Bahian tobacco trade and more specifically the position of the German business community in Bahia. In general terms, we can see that under influence of growing Brazilian and foreign competition the dominance of the German business community gradually decreased. On the other hand, German presence never disappeared. In the light of the political events this may well be the most intriguing aspect of the German presence in Bahia. How did entrepreneurs like Dannemann and Suerdieck weather the political storms of their period? The answer must be sought in two related factors. These German migrant entrepreneurs by settling in the region gradually integrated in the region. They married into Brazilian families or established friendship or business ties with Bahian colleagues. In the same process, they little by little distanced themselves from their German roots. This process was stimulated by the radical nationalist (and increasingly racist) perspective in Germany. Germans in Bahia could not permit themselves the luxury to reproduce these nationalist German categories. They avoided being drawn into political or national partisanship which could easily have antagonised them from their other business associates and Brazilian society in general. By maintaining a delicate balance they were capable to maintain themselves successfully in a politically and culturally foreign society.
